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Abstract—As a significant business paradigm, many online information platforms have emerged to satisfy society’s needs for
person-specific data, where a service provider collects raw data from data contributors, and then offers value-added data services to
data consumers. However, in the data trading layer, the data consumers face a pressing problem, i.e., how to verify whether the service
provider has truthfully collected and processed data? Furthermore, the data contributors are usually unwilling to reveal their sensitive
personal data and real identities to the data consumers. In this paper, we propose TPDM, which efficiently integrates data Truthfulness
and Privacy preservation in Data Markets. TPDM is structured internally in an Encrypt-then-Sign fashion, using partially homomorphic
encryption and identity-based signature. It simultaneously facilitates batch verification, data processing, and outcome verification, while
maintaining identity preservation and data confidentiality. We also instantiate TPDM with a profile matching service and a distribution
fitting service, and extensively evaluate their performances on Yahoo! Music ratings dataset and 2009 RECS dataset, respectively. Our
analysis and evaluation results reveal that TPDM achieves several desirable properties, while incurring low computation and
communication overheads when supporting large-scale data markets.
Index Terms—Data markets, data truthfulness, privacy preservation
F
1 INTRODUCTION
IN the era of big data, society has developed an insatiableappetite for sharing personal data. Realizing the poten-
tial of personal data’s economic value in decision making
and user experience enhancement, several open information
platforms have emerged to enable person-specific data to be
exchanged on the Internet [1], [2], [3], [4], [5]. For example,
Gnip, which is Twitter’s enterprise API platform, collects so-
cial media data from Twitter users, mines deep insights into
customized audiences, and provides data analysis solutions
to more than 95% of the Fortune 500 [1].
However, there exists a critical security problem in these
market-based platforms, i.e., it is difficult to guarantee the
truthfulness in terms of data collection and data processing,
especially when the privacies of the data contributors are
needed to be preserved. Let’s examine the role of a pollster
in the presidential election as follows. As a reliable source
of intelligence, the Gallup Poll [6] uses impeccable data to
assist presidential candidates in identifying and monitor-
ing economic and behavioral indicators. In this scenario,
simultaneously ensuring data truthfulness and preserving
privacy require the Gallup Poll to convince the presidential
candidates that those indicators are derived from live inter-
views without leaking any interviewer’s real identity (e.g.,
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social security number) or the content of her interview. If
raw data sets for drawing these indicators are mixed with
even a small number of bogus or synthetic samples, it will
exert bad influence on the final election result.
Ensuring data truthfulness and protecting the privacies
of data contributors are both important to the long term
healthy development of data markets. On one hand, the
ultimate goal of the service provider in a data market is
to maximize her profit. Therefore, in order to minimize the
expenditure for data acquisition, an opportunistic way for
the service provider is to mingle some bogus or synthetic
data into the raw data set. Yet, to reduce operation cost, a
cunning service provider may provide data services based
on a subset of the whole raw data set, or even return a fake
result without processing the data from designated sources.
However, if such speculative and illegal behaviors cannot be
identified and prohibited, it will cause heavy losses to data
consumers, and thus destabilize the data market. On the
other hand, while unleashing the power of personal data, it
is the bottom line of every business to respect the privacies
of data contributors. The debacle, which follows AOL’s pub-
lic release of “anonymized” search records of its customers,
highlights the potential risk to individuals in sharing per-
sonal data with private companies [7]. Besides, according to
the survey report of 2016 TRUSTe/NCSA Consumer Privacy
Infographic - US Edition [8], 89% of consumers say they
avoid companies that do not respect privacy. Therefore, the
content of raw data should not be disclosed to the data
consumers to guarantee data confidentiality, even if the real
identities of the data contributors are hidden.
To integrate data truthfulness and privacy preservation
in a practical data market, there are four major challenges.
The first and the thorniest design challenge is that verify-
ing the truthfulness of data collection and preserving the
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privacy seem to be contradictory objectives. Ensuring the
truthfulness of data collection allows the data consumers
to verify the validities of data contributors’ identities and
the content of raw data, whereas privacy preservation tends
to prevent them from learning these confidential contents.
Specifically, the property of non-repudiation in classical dig-
ital signature schemes implies that the signature is unforge-
able, and any third party is able to verify the authenticity of
a data submitter using her public key and the corresponding
digital certificate, i.e., the truthfulness of data collection in
our model. However, the verification in digital signature
schemes requires the knowledge of raw data, and can eas-
ily leak a data contributor’s real identity [9]. Regarding a
message authentication code (MAC), each pair of a data
contributor and a data consumer need to agree on a shared
secret key, which is unpractical in data markets.
Yet, another challenge comes from data processing,
which makes verifying the truthfulness of data collection
even harder. Nowadays, more and more data markets pro-
vide data services rather than directly offering raw data.
The following reasons account for this trend: 1) For the data
contributors, they have severe privacy concerns [8]. Never-
theless, the service-based trading mode, which has hidden
the sensitive raw data, alleviates their concerns; 2) For the
service provider, comprehensive and insightful data services
can bring in more profits [10]; 3) For the data consumers,
data copyright infringement [11] is serious. However, such
a data trading mode differs from most of conventional data
sharing scenarios, e.g., data publishing [12]. Besides, the data
services, as the results of data processing, may no longer be
semantically consistent with the raw data [13], which makes
the data consumers hard to believe the truthfulness of data
collection. In addition, the digital signatures on raw data
become invalid for the data services, which discourages
the data consumers from doing verification as mentioned
above. Moreover, although data provenance [14] helps to
determine the derivation histories of data processing results,
it cannot guarantee the truthfulness of data collection. While
knowledge provenance [15], an enhanced version of data
provenance, tackles the deficiency of data provenance, but
it breaks the property of identity preservation.
The third challenge lies in how to guarantee the truthful-
ness of data processing, under the information asymmetry
between the data consumers and the service provider due
to data confidentiality. In particular, to ensure data confiden-
tiality against the data consumers, the service provider can
employ a conventional symmetric/asymmetric cryptosys-
tem, and let the data contributors encrypt their raw data.
Unfortunately, a hidden problem arisen is that the data
consumers fail to verify the correctness and completeness
of returned data services. Even worse, some greedy service
providers may exploit this vulnerability to reduce operation
cost during the execution of data processing, e.g., they
might return an incomplete data service without processing
the whole data set, or even return an outright fake result
without processing the data from designated data sources.
Last but not least, the fourth design challenge is the
efficiency requirement of data markets, especially for data
acquisition, i.e., the service provider should be able to collect
data from a large number of data contributors with low
latency. Due to the timeliness of some kinds of person-
specific data, the service provider has to periodically col-
lect fresh raw data to meet the diverse demands of high-
quality data services. For example, 25 billion data collection
activities take place on Gnip every day [1]. Meanwhile,
the service provider needs to verify data authentication
and data integrity. One basic approach is to let each data
contributor sign her raw data. However, classical digital
signature schemes, which verify the received signatures
one after another, may fail to satisfy the stringent time
requirement of data markets. Furthermore, the maintenance
of digital certificates under the traditional Public Key Infras-
tructure (PKI) also incurs significant communication over-
head. Under such circumstances, verifying a large number
of signatures sequentially certainly becomes the processing
bottleneck at the service provider.
In this paper, by jointly considering above four chal-
lenges, we propose TPDM, which achieves both data
Truthfulness and Privacy preservation in Data Markets.
TPDM first exploits partially homomorphic encryption to
construct a ciphertext space, which enables the service
provider to launch data services and the data consumers
to verify the truthfulness of data processing, while main-
taining data confidentiality. In contrast to classical digital
signature schemes, which are operated over plaintexts, our
new identity-based signature scheme is conducted in the
ciphertext space. Furthermore, each data contributor’s sig-
nature is derived from her real identity, and is unforgeable
against the service provider or other external attackers.
This appealing property can convince the data consumers
that the service provider has truthfully collected data. To
reduce the latency caused by verifying a bulk of signatures,
we propose a two-layer batch verification scheme, which
is built on the bilinear property of admissible pairing. At
last, TPDM realizes identity preservation and revocability
by carefully adopting ElGamal encryption and introducing
a semi-honest registration center.
We summarize our key contributions as follows.
• To the best of our knowledge, TPDM is the first
secure mechanism for data markets achieving both data
truthfulness and privacy preservation.
• TPDM is structured internally in a way of Encrypt-
then-Sign using partially homomorphic encryption and
identity-based signature. It enforces the service provider
to truthfully collect and process real data. Besides, TPDM
incorporates a two-layer batch verification scheme with an
efficient outcome verification scheme, which can drastically
reduce computation overhead.
• We instructively instantiate TPDM with two kinds of
practical data services, namely profile matching and distri-
bution fitting. Besides, we implement these two concrete
data markets, and extensively evaluate their performances
on Yahoo! Music ratings dataset and 2009 RECS dataset. Our
analysis and evaluation results reveal that TPDM achieves
good effectiveness and efficiency in large-scale data mar-
kets. Specifically, for profile matching, when supporting as
many as 1 million data contributors in one session of data
acquisition, the computation and communication overheads
at the service provider are 0.930s and 0.235KB per matching
with 10 attributes in each profile, respectively. In addition,
the outcome verification’s overhead per matching is only
1.17% of the original similarity evaluation’s cost.
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Fig. 1. A two-layer system model for data markets.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we introduce system model, adversary model,
and technical preliminary. We show the detailed design of
TPDM in Section 3, and analyze its security in Section 4.
In Section 5, we elaborate on the applications of TPDM
to profile matching and distribution fitting. The evaluation
results are presented in Section 6. We briefly review related
work in Section 7. We conclude the paper in Section 8.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first describe a general system model for
data markets. We then introduce the adversary model, and
present corresponding security requirements on the design.
We finally review technical preliminary.
2.1 System Model
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider a two-layer system model
for data markets. The model has a data acquisition layer
and a data trading layer. There are four major kinds of
entities, including data contributors, a service provider, data
consumers, and a registration center.
In the data acquisition layer, the service provider pro-
cures massive raw data from the data contributors, such as
social network users, mobile smart devices, smart meters,
and so on. In order to incentivize more data contributors
to actively submit high-quality data, the service provider
needs to reward those valid ones to compensate their data
collection costs. For the sake of security, each registered
data contributor is equipped with a tamper-proof device.
The tamper-proof device can be implemented in the form
of either specific hardware [16] or software [17]. It prevents
any adversary from extracting the information stored in the
device, including cryptographic keys, codes, and data.
We consider that the service provider is cloud based, and
has abundant computing resources, network bandwidths,
and storage space. Besides, she tends to offer semantically
rich and value-added data services to data consumers rather
than directly revealing sensitive raw data, e.g., social net-
work analyses, probability distributions, personalized rec-
ommendations, and aggregate statistics.
The registration center maintains an online database of
registrations, and assigns each registered data contributor
an identity and a password to activate the tamper-proof
device. Besides, she maintains an official website, called
certificated bulletin board [18], [19], on which the legitimate
system participants can publish essential information, e.g.,
whitelists, blacklists, resubmit-lists, and reward-lists of data
contributors. Yet, another duty of the registration center
is to set up the parameters for a signature scheme and
a cryptosystem. To avoid being a single point of failure
or bottleneck, redundant registration centers, which have
identical functionalities and databases, can be installed.
2.2 Adversary Model
In this section, we focus on attacks in practical data markets,
and define corresponding security requirements.
First, we consider that a malicious data contributor or
an external attacker may impersonate other legitimate data
contributors to submit possibly bogus raw data. Besides,
some malicious attackers may deliberately modify raw data
during submission. Hence, the service provider needs to
confirm that raw data are indeed sent unaltered by regis-
tered data contributors, i.e., to guarantee data authentication
and data integrity in the data acquisition layer.
Second, the service provider in the data market might be
greedy, and attempts to maximize her profit by launching
the following two types of attacks:
• Partial data collection: To cut down the expenditure on
data acquisition, the service provider may insert bogus
data into the raw data set.
• No/Partial data processing: To reduce the operation cost,
the service provider may try to return a fake result
without processing the data from designated sources,
or to provide data services based on a subset of the
whole raw data set.
On one hand, to counter partial data collection attack, each
data consumer should be enabled to verify whether raw
data are really provided by registered data contributors, i.e.,
truthfulness of data collection in the data trading layer. On the
other hand, the data consumer should have the capability
to verify the correctness and completeness of a returned data
service in order to combat no/partial data processing attack.
We here use the term truthfulness of data processing in the
data trading layer to represent the integrated requirement
of correctness and completeness of data processing results.
Third, we assume that some honest-but-curious data
contributors, the service provider, the data consumers, and
external attackers, e.g., eavesdroppers, may glean sensitive
information from raw data, and recognize real identities
of data contributors for illegal purposes, e.g., an attacker
can infer a data contributor’s home location from her GPS
records. Hence, raw data of a data contributor should be
kept secret from these system participants, i.e., data confi-
dentiality. Besides, an outside observer cannot reveal a data
contributor’s real identity by analysing data sets sent by her,
i.e., identity preservation.
Fourth, a minority of data contributors may try to behave
illegally, e.g., launching attacks as mentioned above, if there
is no punishment. To prevent this threat, the registration
center should have the ability to retrieve a data contributor’s
real identity, and revoke it from further usage, when her
signature is in dispute, i.e., traceability and revocability.
Last but not least, the semi-honest registration center
may misbehave by trying to link a data contributor’s real
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Fig. 2. System architecture of TPDM.
identity with her raw data. Besides, if there is no detection
or verification in the cryptosystem, she may deliberately
corrupt the decrypted results. However, to guarantee full
side information protection, the requirement on the reg-
istration center is that she cannot leak decrypted samples
to irrelevant system participants. Moreover, she is required
to perform an acknowledged number of decryptions in a
specific data service [20], which should be publicly posted
on the certificated bulletin board.
2.3 Admissible Pairing
In this section, we introduce admissible pairing, which is
the basis of our design.
The multiplicative cyclic groups G1,G2, and GT are of
the same prime order q. Let g1 be a generator of G1, and g2
be a generator of G2. An asymmetric bilinear map is a map
eˆ : G1 ×G2 → GT with the following three properties:
• Bilinearity: ∀X,Y ∈ G1,∀Z ∈ G2,∀a, b ∈ Z∗q ,
eˆ(Xa, Zb) = eˆ(X,Z)ab.
In addition,
eˆ(XY,Z) = eˆ(X,Z) · eˆ(Y,Z).
• Non-degeneracy: eˆ(g1, g2) 6= 1GT .
• Computability: Given X ∈ G1, Z ∈ G2, there exists an
efficient algorithm to compute eˆ(X,Z).
We call such a bilinear map eˆ an admissible pairing,
which can be constructed based on elliptic curves with
modified Weil [21] or Tate pairing [22]. Each operation for
computing eˆ(X,Z) is called pairing operation. The group
that possesses such a map eˆ is called a bilinear group,
where the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is easy,
while the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem is
hard [21]. For example, given (g1, g1a, g1b) for unknown
(a, b), it is computationally intractable to compute g1ab.
3 DESIGN OF TPDM
In this section, we propose TPDM, which integrates data
truthfulness and privacy preservation in data markets.
3.1 Design Rationales
Using the terminology from the signcryption scheme [23],
TPDM is structured internally in a way of Encrypt-then-
Sign, using partially homomorphic encryption and identity-
based signature. It enforces the service provider to truthfully
collect and process real data. The essence of TPDM is to first
synchronize data processing and signature verification into
the same ciphertext space, and then to tightly integrate data
processing with outcome verification via the homomorphic
properties. With the help of the architectural overview in
Fig. 2, we illustrate the design rationales as follows.
Space Construction. The thorniest problem is how to
enable the data consumer to verify the validnesses of signa-
tures, while maintaining data confidentiality. If the signature
scheme is applied to the plaintext space, the data consumer
needs to know the content of raw data for verification.
However, if we employ a conventional public key encryp-
tion scheme to construct the ciphertext space, the service
provider has to decrypt and then process the data. Even
worse, such a construction is vulnerable to the no/partial
data processing attack, because the data consumer, only
knowing the ciphertexts, fails to verify the correctness and
completeness of the data service. Thus, the greedy service
provider may reduce operation cost, by returning a fake
result or manipulating the inputs of data processing. There-
fore, we turn to the partially homomorphic cryptosystems
for encryption, whose properties facilitate both data pro-
cessing and outcome verification on the ciphertexts.
Batch Verification. After constructing the ciphertext
space, we can let each data contributor digitally sign her
encrypted raw data. Given the ciphertext and the signature,
the service provider is able to verify data authentication
and data integrity. Besides, we can treat the data consumer
as a third party to verify the truthfulness of data collec-
tion. However, an immediate question arisen is that the
sequential verification schema may fail to meet the stringent
time requirement of large-scale data markets. In addition,
the maintenance of digital certificates also incurs significant
communication overhead. To tackle these two problems, we
propose an identity-based signature scheme, which sup-
ports two-layer batch verifications, while incurring small
computation and communication overheads.
Breach Detection. Yet, another problem in existing
identity-based signature schemes is that the real identities
are viewed as public parameters, and are not well protected.
On the other hand, if all the real identities are hidden,
none of the misbehaved data contributors can be identified.
To meet these two seemly contradictory requirements, we
employ ElGamal encryption to generate pseudo identities
for registered data contributors, and introduce a new third
party, called registration center. Specifically, the registration
center, who owns the private key, is the only authorized
party to retrieve the real identities, and to revoke those
malicious accounts from further usage.
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3.2 Design Details
Following the guidelines given above, we now introduce
TPDM in detail. TPDM consists of 5 phases: initialization,
signing key generation, data submission, data processing
and verifications, and tracing and revocation.
Phase I: Initialization
We assume that the registration center sets up the system
parameters at the beginning of data trading as follows:
• The registration center chooses three multiplicative
cyclic groups G1, G2, and GT with the same prime order q.
Besides, g1 is a generator of G1, and g2 is a generator of G2.
Moreover, these three cyclic groups compose an admissible
pairing eˆ : G1 ×G2 → GT .
• The registration center randomly picks s1, s2 ∈ Z∗q as
her two master keys, and then computes
P0 = g1
s1 , P1 = g2
s1 , and P2 = g2s2 (1)
as public keys. The master keys s1, s2 are preloaded into
each registered data contributor’s tamper-proof device.
• The registration center sets up parameters for a par-
tially homomorphic cryptosystem: a private key SK, a pub-
lic key PK, an encryption scheme E(·), and a decryption
scheme D(·).
• To activate the tamper-proof device, each registered
data contributor oi is assigned with a “real” identity RIDi ∈
G1 and a password PWi. Here, RIDi uniquely identifies oi,
while PWi is required in the access control process.
• The system parameters
{eˆ,G1,G2,GT , q, g1, g2, P0, P1, P2, PK, E(·)}
are published on the certificated bulletin board.
Phase II: Signing Key Generation
To achieve anonymous authentication in data markets,
the tamper-proof device is utilized to generate a pair of
pseudo identity PIDi and secret key SKi for each registered
data contributor oi:
PIDi = 〈PID1i ,PID2i 〉 = 〈g1r,RIDi  P0r〉, (2)
SKi = 〈SK1i , SK2i 〉 = 〈PID1i s1 , H(PID2i )s2〉. (3)
Here, r is a per-session random nonce,  represents the
Exclusive-OR (XOR) operation, and H(·) is a MapToPoint
hash function [21], i.e., H(·) : {0, 1}∗ → G1. Besides, PIDi
is an ElGamal encryption [24] of the real identity RIDi over
the elliptic curve, while SKi is generated accordingly by
exploiting identity-based encryption (IBE) [21].
Phase III: Data Submission
For the submission of raw data, we need to jointly
consider several security issues, including confidentiality,
authentication, and integrity. To provide data confidential-
ity, we employ partially homomorphic encryption. Besides,
to guarantee data authentication and data integrity, the
encrypted raw data should be signed before submission,
and also should be verified after reception.
I Data Encryption
Ahead of submission, each data contributor oi encrypts
her raw data Ui to different powers under the public key
PK, and gets the ciphertext vector
~Di = E(Ui
k)|k∈K⊆Z+ , (4)
where K is a set of positive integers, and is determined by
the requirements of data services, e.g., the location-based
aggregate statistics [20] may require K = {1}, whereas in
the fine-grained profile matching [25], K = {1, 2}.
In general, compared with the time-consuming compu-
tation on ciphertexts, the evaluation of plaintexts is quite
more efficient. Therefore, we let each data contributor en-
crypt her raw data to different powers, which can benefit
an optimization in data processing while incurring a small
overhead at each data contributor.
I Encrypted Data Signing
After encryption, each data contributor oi computes the
signature σi on the ciphertext vector ~Di using her secret key:
σi = SK
1
i · SK2i h(Di), (5)
where “·” denotes the group operation in G1, h(·) is a one-
way hash function, e.g., SHA-1 [26], and Di is derived by
concatenating all the elements of ~Di together.
Eventually, the data contributor oi submits her tuple
〈PIDi, ~Di, σi〉 to the service provider. Once receiving the
tuple, the service provider is required to post the pseudo
identity PIDi on the certificated bulletin board for fear of
receiver-repudiation. In addition, to prevent a registered
data contributor from using the same pair of pseudo identity
and secret key for multiple times in different sessions of
data acquisition (analogous to the replay attack scenario
considered in [17]), one intuitive way is to let the service
provider store those used pseudo identities for duplication
check later. Yet, another feasible way is to encapsulate the
signing phase into the tamper-proof device.
Phase IV: Data Processing and Verifications
In this phase, we consider two-layer batch verifications,
i.e., verifications conducted by both the service provider
and the data consumer. Between the two-layer batch veri-
fications, we introduce data processing and signatures ag-
gregation done by the service provider. At last, we present
outcome verification conducted by the data consumer.
Before introducing the verifications, we first discuss
the time period τ of data acquisition. In practice, τ is
determined by the service provider, and is based on the
timeliness of different data items. For example, stock data
is streaming with a minimum update frequency of 1 minute
on Investing [27], while smart meters collect the electrical
usages every 15 minutes [28]. In what follows, we focus on
one time period of data acquisition.
I First-Layer Batch Verification
We assume that the service provider receives a bundle
of data tuples from n distinct data contributors, denoted
as {〈PIDi, ~Di, σi〉|i ∈ [1, n]}, by the end of a time period.
To prevent a malicious data contributor from impersonating
other legitimate ones to submit possibly bogus data, the ser-
vice provider needs to verify the validnesses of signatures
by checking whether
eˆ
(
n∏
i=1
σi, g2
)
= eˆ
(
n∏
i=1
PID1i , P1
)
eˆ
(
n∏
i=1
H(PID2i )
h(Di), P2
)
. (6)
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Compared with single signature verification, this batch
verification scheme can dramatically reduce the verification
latency, especially when verifying a large number of sig-
natures. Since the three pairing operations in Equation (6)
dominate the overall computation cost, the batch verifica-
tion time is almost a constant if the time overhead of n Map-
ToPoint hashings and n exponentiations is small enough
to be emitted. However, in a practical data market, when
the number of data contributors is too large, the expensive
pairing operations cannot dominate the verification time.
We will expand on this point in Section 6.1.
I Data Processing and Signatures Aggregation
Instead of directly trading raw data for revenue, more
and more service providers tend to trade value-added data
services. Typical examples of data services include social
network analyses, personalized recommendations, location-
based services, and probability distribution fittings.
To facilitate generating a precise and customized strategy
in targeted data services, e.g., personalized recommendation
and locate-based service, the data consumer also needs to
provide her own ciphertext vector ~D0 and a threshold δ.
Here, ~D0 is generated from the data consumer’s information
V as follows:
~D0 = E(ωiV
k¯i)|k¯i∈K¯⊆Z+,i∈[1,|K¯|], (7)
where k¯i, ωi are parameters determined by a concrete data
service. For example, the profile-matching service in Sec-
tion 5.1 requires k¯i ∈ {1, 2} and ωi ∈ {−2, 1}.
Now, the service provider can process the collected data
as required by the data consumer. We model such a data
processing in the plaintext space as
γ = f (V,Uc1 , Uc2 , · · · , Ucm) (8)
for generality. Accordingly, f can be equivalently evaluated
in the ciphertext space using
R = E(γ) = F ( ~D0, ~Dc1 ,
~Dc2 , · · · , ~Dcm). (9)
The equivalent transformation from f to F is based on the
properties of the partially homomorphic cryptosystem, e.g.,
homomorphic addition ⊕ and homomorphic multiplication
⊗, which are arithmetic operations on the ciphertexts that
are equivalent to the usual addition and multiplication on
the plaintexts, respectively. Hence, only polynomial func-
tions can be computed in a straightforward way. Never-
theless, most non-polynomial functions, e.g., sigmoid and
rectified linear activation functions in machine learning,
can be well approximated/handled by polynomials [29].
Besides, the function f is determined by the data processing
method, and the choice of a specific partially homomorphic
cryptosystem should support the basic operation(s) in f .
For example, the primitive of aggregate statistics [20] is
addition, so the Paillier scheme [30] can be the first choice;
while the distance calculation [31] requires one more mul-
tiplication, thus, the BGN scheme [32] may be preferred.
Furthermore, in Equation (9), ~D0 is the data consumer’s
ciphertext vector, and ~Dci indicates that the data contributor
oci is one of the m valid data contributors. More precisely,
m is the size of whitelist on the certificated bulletin board,
and its default value is n. However, if either of the two-layer
batch verifications fails, m will be updated in the following
tracing and revocation phase. For brevity in notations, we
use C to denote the indexes of m valid data contributors,
i.e., C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm}.
Next, the service provider sends R to the registration
center for decryption. We note that the registration cen-
ter can only perform decryption for acknowledged times,
which should be publicly announced on the certificated
bulletin board. For example, in the aggregate statistic over a
valid dataset of size m, the registration center just needs to
do one decryption, and cannot do more than required. The
reason is that the service provider can still obtain the correct
aggregate result by decrypting all m encrypted raw data.
Upon getting the plaintext γ, the service provider can
compare it with δ, and obtain the comparison result ϑ. For
convenience, the concrete-value result γ and the comparison
result ϑ are collectively called outcome. We note that the
outcome may be in different formats, e.g., average speed in
location-based aggregate statistic [20], shopping suggestion
in private recommendation [33], and friending strategy in
social networking [25]. We assume that the outcome in-
volves φ candidate data contributors, and the subscripts of
their pseudo identities are denoted as I = {I1, I2, · · · , Iφ} .
After data processing, to further reduce communication
overhead, the service provider can aggregate φ candidate
signatures into one signature. In our scheme, the aggregate
signature σ =
∏
i∈I σi. Then, the service provider sends the
final tuple to the data consumer, including the data service
outcome, the aggregate signature σ, the index set I, and φ
candidate ciphertexts { ~Di|i ∈ I}.
I Second-Layer Batch Verification
Similar to the first-layer batch verification, the data
consumer can verify the legitimacies of φ candidate data
sources by checking whether
eˆ (σ, g2)
= eˆ
(∏
i∈I
PID1i , P1
)
eˆ
(∏
i=1
H(PID2i )
h(Di), P2
)
. (10)
Here, the pseudo identities on the right hand side of the
above equation can be fetched from the certificated bulletin
board according to the index set I.
I Outcome Verification
The homomorphic properties also enable the data con-
sumer to verify the truthfulness of data processing. Under
the condition that the data consumer knows her plaintext
V , all the cross terms involving ~D0 in Equation (9) can be
evaluated through multiplication by a constant V . Hence,
part of the most time-consuming homomorphic multiplica-
tions in the original data processing are no longer needed
in outcome verification. Besides, if for correctness, the data
consumer just needs to evaluate on the φ candidate cipher-
texts. Of course, she reserves the right to require the service
provider to send her the other (m−φ) valid ones, on which
the completeness can be verified.
In fact, if φ or m − φ is too large, the data consumer
can take the strategy of random sampling for verification,
where the m valid pseudo identities on the certificated bul-
letin board can be used for the sampling indexes. Random
sampling is a tradeoff between security and efficiency, and
we shall illustrate its feasibility in Section 5 and Section 6.1.
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Algorithm 1 `-DEPTH-TRACING
Initialization: S = {σ1, · · · , σn}, head = 1, tail = n, limit = `,
whitelist = ∅, blacklist = ∅, resubmitlist = ∅
1: Function `-DEPTH-TRACING(S, head, tail, limit)
2: if |whitelist|+ |blacklist| = n or limit = 0 then
3: return
4: else if CHECK-VALID(S, head, tail) = true then
5: ADD-TO-WHITELIST(head, tail)
6: else if head = tail then . Single signature verification
7: ADD-TO-BLACKLIST(head, tail)
8: else . Batch signatures verification from σhead to σtail
9: mid = bhead+tail
2
c
10: `-DEPTH-TRACING(S, head,mid, limit− 1)
11: `-DEPTH-TRACING(S,mid+ 1, tail, limit− 1)
Phase V: Tracing and Revocation
The two-layer batch verifications only hold when all
the signatures are valid, and fail even when there is a
single invalid signature. In practice, a signature batch may
contain invalid one(s) caused by accidental data corruption
or possibly malicious activities launched by an external
attacker. Traditional batch verifier would reject the entire
batch, even if there is a single invalid signature, and thus
waste the other valid data items. Therefore, tracing and/or
recollecting invalid data items and their corresponding sig-
natures are important in practice. If the second-layer batch
verification fails, the data consumer can require the service
provider to find out the invalid signature(s). Similarly, if the
first-layer batch verification fails, the service provider has to
find out the invalid one(s) by herself.
To extract invalid signatures, as shown in Algorithm 1,
we propose `-DEPTH-TRACING algorithm. We consider that
the batch contains n signatures. In addition, the whitelist,
the blacklist, and the resubmit-list of pseudo identities are
global variables, and are initialized as empty sets. If a batch
verification fails, the service provider first finds out the mid-
point as mid = b 1+n2 c (Line 9). Then, she performs batch
verification on the first half (head to mid) (Line 10) and the
second half (mid+ 1 to tail) (Line 11), respectively. If either
of these two halves causes a failure, the service provider
repeats the same process on it. Otherwise, she adds the
pseudo identities from the valid half to the whitelist (Line
4-5). The recursive process terminates, if validnesses of all
the signatures have been identified or a pre-defined limit
of search depth is reached (Line 2). A special case is the
single signature verification, in which the service provider
can determine its validness (Line 6-7). After this algorithm,
the service provider can form the resubmit-list of pseudo
identities by excluding those in the other two lists.
According to the blacklist on the certificated bulletin
board, the registration center can reveal the real identities of
those invalid data contributors. Given the data contributor
oi’s pseudo identity PIDi, the registration center can use her
master key s1 to perform revealing by computing
PID2i  PID1i s1 = RIDi  P0r  g1s1·r = RIDi. (11)
Upon getting a misbehaved data contributor’s real identity,
the registration center can revoke it from further usage if
necessary, e.g., deleting her account from the online reg-
istration database. Thus, the revoked data contributor can
no longer activate the tamper-proof device, which indicates
that she does not have the right to submit data any more.
4 SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the security of TPDM in terms of
the desirable properties preconcerted in Section 2.2.
4.1 Data Authentication and Data Integrity
Data authentication and data integrity are regarded as two
basic security requirements in the data acquisition layer.
The signature in TPDM σi = SK1i · SK2i h(Di) is actually
a one-time identity-based signature. We now prove that if
the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem in the
bilinear group G1 is hard [21], an attacker cannot success-
fully forge a valid signature on behalf of any registered data
contributor except with a negligible probability.
First, we consider Game 1 between a challenger and an
attacker as follows:
Setup: The challenger starts by giving the attacker the
system parameters g1 and P0. The challenger also offers
a pseudo identity PIDi = 〈PID1i ,PID2i 〉 to the attacker,
which simulates the condition that the pseudo identities
are posted on the certificated bulletin board in TPDM.
Query: We assume that the attacker does not know how
to compute the MapToPoint hash function H(·) and
the one-way hash function h(·). However, she can ask
the challenger for the value H(PID2i ) and the one-way
hashes h(·) for up to n different messages.
Challenge: The challenger asks the attacker to pick two
random messages Mi1 and Mi2 , and to generate two
corresponding signatures σi1 and σi2 on behalf of the
data contributor oi.
Guess: The attacker returns 〈Mi1 , σi1〉 and 〈Mi2 , σi2〉 to
the challenger. We denote the attacker’s advantage in
winning Game 1 to be
1 = Pr[σi1 and σi2 are valid]. (12)
We further claim that our signature scheme is adaptively
secure against existential forgery, if 1 is negligible. We
prove our claim using Game 2 by reduction [34].
Second, we assume that there exists a probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm A such that it has the same non-
negligible advantage 1 as the attacker in Game 1. Then, we
will construct Game 2, in which an attacker B can make
use of A to break the CDH assumption with non-negligible
probability. In particular, B is given (g1, g1a, g1b, g1c, d) for
unknown (a, b, c) and known d, and is asked to compute
g1
2ab · g1cd. We note that computing g12ab · g1cd is as hard
as computing g1ab, which is the original CDH problem. We
present the details of Game 2 as follows:
Setup: B makes up the parameters g1 and P0 = g1a,
where a plays the role of the master key s1 in TPDM.
Besides, B also provides A with a pseudo identity
PIDi = 〈PID1i ,PID2i 〉 = 〈g1b,RIDi  g1ab〉. Here, b
functions as the random nonce r in TPDM.
Query: A then asks B for the value H(PID2i )s2 , and B
replies with g1c. We note that H(PID2i ) is the only
MapToPoint hash operation needed to forge the data
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contributor oi’s valid signatures. Besides,A picks n ran-
dom messages, and requests B for their one-way hash
values h(·). B answers these queries using a random
oracle: Bmaintains a table to store all the answers. Upon
receiving a message, if the message has been queried
before, B answers with the stored value; otherwise, she
answers with a random value, which is stored into the
table for later usage. Except for the x-th and y-th queries
(i.e., messages Mx and My), B answers with the values
d1 and d2, respectively, where d1 + d2 = d.
Challenge: When the query phase is over, B asks A to
choose two random messages Mi1 and Mi2 , and to sign
them on behalf of the data contributor oi.
Guess: A returns two signatures σi1 and σi2 on the mes-
sagesMi1 andMi2 to B. We note thatMi1 andMi2 must
be within the n queried messages; otherwise,A does not
know h(Mi1) and h(Mi2). Furthermore, if Mi1 = Mx
and Mi2 = My or Mi1 = My and Mi2 = Mx, B then
computes σi1 · σi2 , which is equivalent to:
SK1i · SK2i h(Mi1 ) · SK1i · SK2i h(Mi2 )
= SK1i
2 · SK2i h(Mi1 )+h(Mi2 )
= g1
2ab · g1cd. (13)
After obtaining σi1 ·σi2 , B solves the given CDH instance
successfully. We note that A’s advantage in breaking
TPDM is 1, and the probability that A picks Mx and
My is 2n(n−1) . Thus, the probability of B’s success is:
2 = Pr[B succeeds] = 21
n(n− 1) . (14)
Since 1 is non-negligible, B can solve the CDH problem
with the non-negligible probability 2, which contradicts
with the assumption that the CDH problem is hard. This
completes our proof. Therefore, our signature scheme is
adaptively secure under the random oracle model.
Last but not least, the first-layer batch verification
scheme in TPDM is correct if and only if Equation (6) holds.
By capitalizing the bilinear property of admissible pairing,
the left hand side of Equation (6) expands as:
eˆ
(
n∏
i=1
σi, g2
)
= eˆ
(
n∏
i=1
SK1i · SK2i h(Di), g2
)
= eˆ
(
n∏
i=1
SK1i , g2
)
eˆ
(
n∏
i=1
SK2i
h(Di)
, g2
)
= eˆ
(
n∏
i=1
PID1i
s1
, g2
)
eˆ
(
n∏
i=1
H(PID2i )
s2h(Di), g2
)
= eˆ
(
n∏
i=1
PID1i , g2
s1
)
eˆ
(
n∏
i=1
H(PID2i )
h(Di), g2
s2
)
= eˆ
(
n∏
i=1
PID1i , P1
)
eˆ
(
n∏
i=1
H(PID2i )
h(Di), P2
)
, (15)
which is the right hand side as required.
In conclusion, our novel identity-based signature scheme
is provably secure, and the properties of data authentication
and data integrity are achieved.
4.2 Truthfulness of Data Collection
To guarantee the truthfulness of data collection, we need
to combat the partial data collection attack defined in Sec-
tion 2.2. We note that it is just a special case of Game 1
in Section 4.1, where the service provider is the attacker.
Hence, it is infeasible for the service provider to forge valid
signatures on behalf of any registered data contributor. Such
an appealing property prevents the service provider from
injecting spurious data undetectably, and enforces her to
truthfully collect real data.
Similar to data authentication and data integrity, the data
consumer can verify the truthfulness of data collection by
performing the second-layer batch verification with Equa-
tion (10). Proof of correctness is similar to Equation (15) for
the first-layer batch verification, where we can just replace
the aggregate signature σ with
∏
i∈I σi.
4.3 Truthfulness of Data Processing
We now analyze the truthfulness of data processing from
two aspects, i.e., correctness and completeness.
Correctness. TPDM ensures the truthfulness of data col-
lection, which is the premise of a correct data service. Then,
given a truthfully collected dataset, the data consumer can
evaluate the φ candidate data sources, which is consistent
with the original data processing due to the homomorphic
properties of the partially homomorphic cryptosystem.
Completeness. In fact, our design provides the property
of completeness by guaranteeing the correctness of n, m,
and φ, which are the numbers of total, valid, and candidate
data contributors, respectively:
First, the service provider cannot deliberately omit a data
contributor’s real data. The reason is that if the data contrib-
utor has submitted her encrypted raw data, without finding
her pseudo identity on the certificated bulletin board, she
would obtain no reward for data contribution. Therefore,
she has incentives to report data missing to the registration
center, which in turn ensures the correctness of n.
Second, we consider that the service provider compro-
mises the number of valid data contributors m in two ways:
one is to put a valid data contributor’s pseudo identity into
the blacklist; the other is to put an invalid pseudo identity
into the whitelist. We discuss these two cases separately: 1)
In the first case, the valid data contributor would not only
receive no reward, but may also be revoked from the online
registration database. Hence, she has strong incentives to
resort to the registration center for arbitration. Besides, we
claim that the service provider wins the arbitration except
with negligible probability. We give the detailed proof via
Game 3 between a challenger and an attacker:
Setup: The challenger first gives the attacker m valid data
tuples, denoted as {〈PIDi, ~Di, σi〉|i ∈ C}. This simulates
the data submissions from m valid data contributors.
Challenge: The challenger asks the attacker to pick a
random data contributor oi within the m given ones,
and then requests the attacker to generate a signature
σ∗i on the ciphertext vector ~Di.
Guess: The attacker returns σ∗i to the challenger. The
attacker wins Game 3, if σ∗i 6= σi, σ∗i passes the chal-
lenger’s verification, and σi fails in the verification.
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Next, we demonstrate that the attacker’s winning probabil-
ity in Game 3, denoted as
3 = Pr[σ∗i 6= σi, σ∗i passes verification, and σi fails], (16)
is negligible. On one hand, the verification scheme in TPDM
is publicly verifiable, which indicates that the challenger can
verify the legitimacies of both σ∗i and σi through checking
whether eˆ (σ
∗
i , g2) = eˆ
(
PID1i , P1
)
eˆ
(
H(PID2i )
h(Di), P2
)
,
eˆ (σi, g2) 6= eˆ
(
PID1i , P1
)
eˆ
(
H(PID2i )
h(Di), P2
)
,
(17)
hold at the same time. We note that the above two equations
conform to the formula of single signature verification, i.e.,
n = 1 in Equation (6). However, the second one contradicts
with our assumption that oi is a valid data contributor.
On the other hand, σ∗i passes the challenger’s verification,
while σ∗i is not equal to σi, which implies that σ
∗
i is a valid
signature forged by the attacker. As shown in Game 1, the
probability of successfully forging a valid signature 1 is
negligible, and thus the attacker’s winning probability in
Game 3 3 is negligible as well. This completes our proof
of thwarting the first case; 2) The second case is essentially
the tracing and revocation phase in Section 3.2, where the
batch of signatures contains invalid ones. Therefore, this
case cannot pass two-layer batch verifications. Besides, the
greedy service provider has no incentives to reward those
invalid data contributors, which could in turn destabilize
the data market. Joint considering above two cases, our
scheme TPDM can guarantee the correctness of m.
Third, as stated in outcome verification, the data con-
sumer reserves the right to verify over all m valid data
items, and the service provider cannot just process a subset
without being found. Thus, the correctness of φ is assured.
In a nutshell, TPDM can guarantee the truthfulness of
data processing in the data trading layer.
4.4 Data Confidentiality
Considering the potential economic value and the sensitive
information contained in raw data, data confidentiality is
a necessity in data markets. Since partially homomorphic
encryption provides semantic security (e.g., [24], [30], [32]),
by definition, except the registration center, any probabilistic
polynomial-time adversary cannot reveal the contents of
raw data. Moreover, although the registration center holds
the private key, she cannot learn the sensitive raw data as
well, since neither the service provider nor the data con-
sumer directly forwards the original ciphertexts of the data
contributors for decryption. Therefore, data confidentiality
is achieved against all these system participants.
4.5 Identity Preservation
To protect a data contributor’s unique identifier in data
markets, her real identity is converted into a random pseudo
identity. We note that the two parts of a pseudo identity are
actually two items of an ElGamal-type ciphertext, which is
semantically secure under the chosen plaintext attack [24].
Furthermore, the linkability between a data contributor’s
signatures does not exist, because the pseudo identities
for different signing instances are indistinguishable. Hence,
identity preservation can be ensured.
4.6 Semi-honest Registration Center
Registration center in TPDM performs two main tasks: one
is to maintain the online database of legal registrations; the
other is to set up the partially homomorphic cryptosystem.
First, as we have clarified in Section 4.4, TPDM guar-
antees data confidentiality against the registration center.
Thus, although she maintains the database of real identities,
she cannot link them with corresponding raw data. Sec-
ond, partially homomorphic encryption schemes (e.g., [24],
[30], [32]) normally provide a proof of decryption, which
indicates that the registration center cannot corrupt the
decrypted results undetectably. Hence, she virtually has no
effect on data processing and outcome verification. At last,
we will further show the feasibility of distributing multiple
registration centers in our evaluation part.
5 TWO PRACTICAL DATA MARKETS
In this section, from a practical standpoint, we consider two
practical data markets, which provide fine-grained profile
matching and multivariate Gaussian distribution fitting,
respectively. The major difference between these two data
markets is whether the data consumer has inputs.
5.1 Fine-grained Profile Matching
We first elaborate on a classic data service in social network-
ing, i.e., fine-grained profile matching. Unlike the directly
interactive scenario in [25], our centralized data market
breaks the limit of neighborhood finding. In particular, a
data consumer’s friending strategy can be derived from a
large scale of data contributions. For convenience, we shall
not differentiate “profile” from “raw data” in the profile-
matching scenario considered here.
During the initial phase of profile matching, the service
provider, e.g., Twitter or OkCupid, defines a public attribute
vector consisting of β attributes A = (A1, A2, · · · , Aβ),
where Ai corresponds to a personal interest, such as movie,
sports, cooking, and so on. Then, to create a fine-grained
personal profile, a data contributor oi, e.g., a Twitter or
OkCupid user, selects an integer uij ∈ [0, θ] to indicate her
level of interest in Aj ∈ A, and thus forms her profile vector
~Ui = (ui1, ui2, · · · , uiβ). Subsequently, the data contributor
oi submits ~Ui to the service provider for matching process.
To facilitate profile matching, the data consumer also
needs to provide her profile vector ~V = (v1, v2, · · · , vβ)
and an acceptable similarity threshold δ, where δ is a non-
negative integer. Without loss of generality, we assume
that the service provider employs Euclidean distance f(·) to
measure the similarity between the data contributor oi and
the data consumer, where f(~Ui, ~V ) =
√∑β
j=1 (uij − vj)2.
We note that if f(~Ui, ~V ) < δ, then the data contributor oi is
a matching target to the data consumer. In what follows,
to simplify construction, we covert the matching metric
f(~Ui, ~V ) < δ to its squared form
∑β
j=1 (uij − vj)2 < δ2.
5.1.1 Recap of Adversary Model
Before introducing our concrete construction, we first give
a brief review of the adversary model and corresponding
security requirements in the context of profile matching.
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Fig. 3. An illustration of fine-grained profile matching.
As shown in Fig. 3, Alice and Bob are registered data
contributors, and Charlie is a data consumer. Here, the par-
tial data collection attack means that to reduce data acquisi-
tion cost, the service provider may insert unregistered/fake
David’s profile. Besides, the partial data processing attack
indicates that to reduce operation cost, the service provider
may just evaluate the similarity between Charlie and Alice,
while generating a random result for Bob. Moreover, the no
data processing attack implies that the service provider just
returns two random matching results without processing
the profiles of both Alice and Bob.
Our joint security requirements of privacy preservation
and data truthfulness mainly include two aspects: 1) With-
out leaking the real identities and the profiles of Alice and
Bob, the service provider needs to prove the legitimacies
of Alice and Bob to Charlie; 2) Without revealing Alice’s
and Bob’s profiles, Charlie can verify the correctness and
completeness of returned matching results.
5.1.2 BGN-Based Construction
Given the profile-matching scenario considered here, we
utilize a partially homomorphic encryption scheme based
on bilinear maps, called Boneh-Goh-Nissim (BGN) cryp-
tosystem [32]. This is because we only require the oblivious
evaluation of quadratic polynomials, i.e.,
∑β
j=1 (uij − vj)2.
In particular, the BGN scheme supports any number of
homomorphic additions after a single homomorphic mul-
tiplication. Now, we briefly introduce how to adapt TPDM
to this practical data market. Due to the limitation of space,
we focus on the major phases, including data submission,
data processing, and outcome verification.
Data Submission: When a data contributor oi intends to
submit her profile ~Ui, she employs the BGN scheme to do
encryption, and gets the ciphertext vector:
~Di =
(
E(uij), E(uij
2)
) |j∈[1,β]. (18)
Afterwards, the data contributor oi computes the signature
σi on ~Di using her secret key SKi:
σi = SK
1
i · SK2i h(Di), (19)
where Di = E(ui1) ‖ . . . ‖ E(uiβ) ‖ E(ui12) ‖ . . . ‖
E(uiβ
2), and “‖” is a message concatenation operation.
By the end of a time period, n distinct data contributors
submit their tuples {〈PIDi, ~Di, σi〉|i ∈ [1, n]} to the service
provider, on which the first-layer batch verification can be
conducted using Equation (6).
Data Processing: To facilitate generating a personalized
friending strategy, the data consumer also needs to provide
her encrypted profile vector ~D0 and a threshold δ, where
~D0 =
(
E(vj
2), E(vj)
−2 = E(−2vj)
) |j∈[1,β]. (20)
Now, the service provider can directly do matching on
the encrypted profiles. For brevity in expression, we assume
that oi is one of the m valid data contributors, i.e., i ∈ C.
Besides, to obliviously evaluate the similarity f(~Ui, ~V ), the
service provider first preprocesses ~Di and ~D0 by adding
E(1) to the first and the last places of two vectors, respec-
tively, and obtains new vectors ~Ci = (C1ij , C
2
ij , C
3
ij)|j∈[1,β]
and ~C0 = (C10j , C
2
0j , C
3
0j)|j∈[1,β], where(
C1ij , C
2
ij , C
3
ij
)
=
(
E(1), E(uij), E(uij
2)
)
, (21)(
C10j , C
2
0j , C
3
0j
)
=
(
E(vj
2), E(−2vj), E(1)
)
. (22)
After preprocessing, the service provider can compute the
“dot product” of Equation (21) and Equation (22), by first
applying homomorphic multiplication ⊗ and then homo-
morphic addition ⊕, and gets Rij , where
Rij = C
1
ij ⊗ C10j ⊕ C2ij ⊗ C20j ⊕ C3ij ⊗ C30j
= E
(
vj
2 + uij(−2vj) + uij2
)
= E
(
(uij − vj)2
)
. (23)
Next, the service provider applies homomorphic additions
⊕ to Rij with ∀j ∈ [1, β], and gets
Ri = ⊕
j∈[1,β]
E
(
(uij − vj)2
)
= E
 β∑
j=1
(uij − vj)2
 . (24)
We note that Ri is actually an encryption of f(~Ui, ~V )2,
which indicates the similarity between the data contributor
oi and the data consumer.
Then, the service provider sends Ri to the registration
center for decryption. We note that for each data contributor,
the registration center just needs to do one decryption, i.e.,
supposing the size of whitelist on the certificated bulletin
board is m, she can only perform m decryptions in total.
The registration center cannot do more decryptions than
required, since the service provider may still obtain a correct
and complete matching strategy by revealing the profiles
of all the valid data contributors and the data consumer.
However, this case requires at least (m + 1)β decryptions.
Furthermore, to speed up BGN decryption in outcome ver-
ification, the registration center should retain the decrypted
plaintexts in storage for a preset validity period.
When obtaining f(~Ui, ~V )2, the service provider com-
pares it with δ2, and thus can determine whether the data
contributor oi matches the data consumer. We assume that
φ data contributors are matched, and the subscripts of their
pseudo identities are denoted as I = {I1, I2, · · · , Iφ}.
After data processing, the service provider aggregates
the signatures of φ matched data contributors into one
signature. Then, she sends the aggregate signature, the
indexes of φ matched data contributors, and their en-
crypted profile vectors to the data consumer, on which
the second-layer batch verification can be performed with
Equation (10). Besides, to prevent the service provider from
changing/revaluating (m − φ) valid but unmatched data
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contributors in the completeness verification later, their
similarities, i.e., {f(~Ui, ~V )2|i ∈ C, i /∈ I}, should also be
forwarded. We note that the pseudo identities of φ matched
data contributors can be viewed as the friending strategy,
i.e., outcome in the general model, since the data consumer
can resort to the registration center, as a relay, for handshak-
ing with those matched data contributors.
Outcome Verification: During the validity period preset
by the registration center, the data consumer can verify the
truthfulness of data processing via homomorphic proper-
ties. For correctness, the data consumer just needs to eval-
uate the φ matched profiles. Of course, for completeness,
the data consumer reserves the right to do verification over
the other (m − φ) unmatched ones. We note that the data
consumer, knowing her own profile vector ~V , can compute
Equation (23) more efficiently through
Rij = E(vj
2)⊕ E (uij)−2vj ⊕ E
(
uij
2
)
. (25)
Thus, the most time-consuming homomorphic multiplica-
tions can be avoided in outcome verification. Moreover,
we note that the registration center does not need to do
decryption as in data processing, since she can just search a
smaller-size table of plaintexts in the storage. If there is no
matched one, the outcome verification fails, and the service
provider will be questioned by the data consumer.
To further reduce verification cost, the data consumer
can take the stratified sampling strategy in practice, e.g., in
our evaluation on a real-world ratings dataset, for correct-
ness, she may check all the φ matched data contributors,
accounting for 4.49% of the total 10000 samples, while only
checking 0.27% of the unmatched ones for completeness.
In particular, regarding completeness verification, the data
consumer can randomly choose part of the (m − φ) valid
but unmatched data contributors, and then request the
service provider to send her their aggregate signature and
encrypted profile vectors for the second-layer batch verifica-
tion and the outcome verification. Here, we assume that the
greedy service provider cheats by not evaluating each data
contributor in the original data processing with a probability
p. Then, the probability of successfully detecting an attempt
to return an incorrect/incomplete result, , increases expo-
nentially with the number of checks c, i.e.,  = 1− (1− p)c.
For example, when p = 20% and c = 10, the success rate 
is already 90%. In fact, a concrete sampling strategy should
depend on practical φ, m, and p.
5.2 Multivariate Gaussian Distribution Fitting
We further consider a different data market, where the ser-
vice provider captures the underlying probability distribu-
tion over the collected dataset, and offers such a distribution
as a data service to the data consumer [35], [36]. This data
service is called probability distribution fitting. For example,
a data analyst, as the data consumer, may want to learn the
distribution of residential energy consumptions.
Due to central limit theorem, we assume that the mul-
tivariate Gaussian distribution can closely approximate the
raw data, which is a widely used assumption in statistical
learning algorithms [37]. For convenience, we continue to
use the notations in profile matching, i.e., the attribute
vector A now represents a vector of β random variables.
In particular, A ∼ N (~µ,Σ), where ~µ is a β-dimensional
mean vector, and Σ is a β × β covariance matrix. Besides,
the covariance matrix can be computed by:
Σ = E
[
AAT
]
− ~µ~µT . (26)
Here, E[·] denotes taking expectation. We below focus on
the key designs different from profile matching.
For data submission, the cipertext vector of the data
contributor oi is changed into:
~Di = (E(uij), E(uij × uik)) |j∈[1,β],k∈[j,β], (27)
where its first element is to facilitate computing the mean
vector ~µ, while its second element is to help the service
provider in evaluating the matrix E[AAT ] more efficiently.
For data processing, the service provider first employs
homomorphic additions⊕ to obliviously compute the mean
vector ~µ, where the ciphertext of its j-th element multiply-
ing the number of valid data contributors m is:
⊕
i∈C
E (uij) = E
(∑
i∈C
uij
)
= E(m× µj). (28)
Additionally, to derive the covariance matrix Σ, it suffices
for the service provider to get E[AAT ]. Here, the service
provider can avoid the time-consuming homomorphic mul-
tiplications. For example, the j-th row, k-th column entry of
E[AAT ], denoted by E[AAT ]jk, can be computed through:
⊕
i∈C
(E (uij × uik)) = E
(∑
i∈C
uij × uik
)
= E
(
m× E
[
AAT
]
jk
)
. (29)
However, supposing that the data contributor oi excluded
{E(uij × uik)|j ∈ [1, β], k ∈ [j, β]} from her ciphertext
vector ~Di, the service provider would need to perform
β(β+1)
2 expensive homomorphic multiplications for the data
contributor oi instead, because E(uij×uik) in Equation (29)
needs to be derived by means of E(uij)⊗ E(uik).
For outcome verification, the data consumer can take the
stratified random sampling strategy from two aspects: 1)
She can randomly check parts of the mean vector ~µ and the
covariance matrix Σ; 2) She can reevaluate a random subset
of m valid data items, and compare the new distribution
with the returned distribution. If their distance is within a
threshold, the data consumer would accept this outcome;
otherwise, she rejects. We note that in the first case, the
valid data contributors may need to re-sign those involved
ciphertexts for the second-layer batch verification.
6 EVALUATION RESULTS
In this section, we show the evaluation results of TPDM in
terms of computation overhead and communication over-
head. We also demonstrate the feasibility of the registration
center and the `-DEPTH-TRACING algorithm.
Datasets: We use two real-world datasets, called R1-
Yahoo! Music User Ratings of Musical Artists Version
1.0 [38] and 2009 Residential Energy Consumption Survey
(RECS) dataset [39], for the profile matching service and the
distribution fitting service, respectively.
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TABLE 1
Time Overheads of Key Operations.
Curve R(G1) Pairing MapToPoint Exponentiation
SS512 512 bits 0.999ms 3.203ms 1.179ms
MNT159 160 bits 3.102ms 0.029ms 0.413ms
First, the Yahoo! dataset represents a snapshot of Yahoo!
Music community’s preference for various musical artists.
It contains 11,557,943 ratings of 98,211 artists given by
1,948,882 anonymous users, and was gathered over the
course of one month prior to March 2004. For profile match-
ing, we choose β common artists as the attributes, append
each user’s corresponding ratings ranging from 0 to 10,
and thus form her fine-grained profile. Second, the RECS
dataset, which was released by U.S. Energy Information
Administration (EIA) in January 2013, provides detailed
information about diverse energy usages in U.S. homes.
This dataset was collected from 12,083 randomly selected
households between July 2009 and December 2012. For dis-
tribution fitting, we view β types of energy consumptions,
e.g., electricity, natural gas, space heating, and water heating,
as β random variables, and intend to obtain the multivariate
Gaussian distribution.
Evaluation Settings: We implemented TPDM using
the latest Pairing-Based Cryptography (PBC) library [40].
The elliptic curves utilized in our identity-based signature
scheme include a supersingular curve with a base field size
of 512 bits and an embedding degree of 2, and a MNT curve
with a base field size of 159 bits and an embedding degree
of 6. In addition, the group order q is 160-bit long, and all
hashings are implemented in SHA1, considering its digest
size closely matches the order of G1. The BGN cryptosystem
is realized using Type A1 pairing, in which the group order
is a product of two 512-bit primes. The running environment
is a standard 64-bit Ubuntu 14.04 Linux operation system on
a desktop with Intel(R) Core(TM) i5 3.10GHz.
Overheads of Key Operations: Table 1 presents the
curve choices along with the computation time of key op-
erations, where SS512 and MNT159 are abbreviated from
the settings of the supersingular curve and the MNT curve
in the identity-based signature scheme, respectively. R(·)
denotes the number of bits needed to optimally represent
a group element. Besides, all the computation time of key
operations is derived from the average of 10000 runs.
6.1 Computation Overhead
We show the computation overheads of four important com-
ponents in TPDM, namely profile matching, distribution
fitting, identity-based signature, and batch verification.
Profile Matching: In Fig. 4a, we plot the computation
overheads of profile encryption, similarity evaluation, and
outcome verification per data contributor, when the number
of attributes β increases from 5 to 40 with a step of 5. From
Fig. 4a, we can see that the computation overheads of these
three phases increase linearly with β. This is because the
profile encryption requires 2β BGN encryptions, the similar-
ity evaluation consists of 3β homomorphic multiplications
and additions, and the outcome verification is composed of
TABLE 2
Computation Overhead of Identity-Based Signature Scheme.
Preparation Operation
Setting Pseudo IdentityGeneration
Secret Key
Generation Signing
SS512 4.698ms (39.40%) 6.023ms (50.53%) 1.201ms (10.07%)
MNT159 1.958ms (57.33%) 1.028ms (30.10%) 0.429ms (12.57%)
3β homomorphic additions and β exponentiations, which
are both proportional to β. In addition, the outcome verifi-
cation is light-weight, whose overhead per data contributor
is only 1.17% of the similarity evaluation’s cost. Moreover,
when β = 10, one decryption overhead at the registration
center is 1.648ms in the original data processing, while in
outcome verification, it is in tens of microseconds.
We further show the feasibility of the stratified sampling
strategy in outcome verification. We analyze the match-
ing ratio based on Yahoo! Music ratings dataset. Given
β = 10, when a data consumer sets her threshold δ = 12,
she is matched with 4.49% in average of the 10000 data
contributors, who are selected randomly from the dataset.
The relatively small matching ratio means that even if all
matched data contributors are verified for correctness, it
only incurs an overhead of 4.859s at the data consumer,
which is roughly 0.05% of the data processing workload at
the service provider. Next, we simulate the partial data pro-
cessing attack by randomly corrupting 20% of unmatched
data contributors, i.e., replacing their similarities with ran-
dom values. Then, the data consumer can detect such type
attack using 26 random checks in average for completeness,
which incurs an additional overhead of 0.281s.
Distribution Fitting: Fig. 4b plots the computation over-
head of the distribution fitting service, where the number of
random variables β increases from 1 to 8, and the number
of valid data contributors m is fixed at 10000. Besides,
for outcome verification, the data consumer checks all the
elements in the mean vector, while only checks the diagonal
elements in the covariance matrix. From Fig. 4b, we can
see that the computation overheads of the first two phases
increase quadratically with β, whereas the computation
overhead of the last phase increases linearly with β. The
reason is that the data encryption phase consists of β(β+3)2
BGN encryptions for each data contributor, and the distribu-
tion evaluation phase mainly comprises mβ(β+3)2 homomor-
phic additions. In contrast, the outcome verification phase
mainly requires 2mβ homomorphic additions. Furthermore,
when β = 8, these three phases consume 0.402s, 140.395s,
and 51.200s, respectively.
Jointly summarizing above evaluation results, TPDM
performs well in both kinds of data markets. Therefore, the
generality of TPDM can be validated.
Identity-Based Signature: We now investigate the com-
putation overhead of the identity-based signature scheme,
including preparation and operation phases. In this set of
simulations, we set the number of data contributors to be
10000. Table 2 lists the average time overhead per data
contributor. From Table 2, we can see that the time cost
of the preparation phase dominates the total overhead in
both SS512 and MNT159. This outcome stems from that the
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pseudo identity generation employs ElGamal encryption,
and the secret key generation is composed of one MapTo-
Point hash operation and two exponentiations. In contrast,
the operation phase mainly consists of one exponentiation.
The above results demonstrate that the identity-based
signature scheme in TPDM is efficient enough, and can be
applied to the data contributors with mobile devices.
Batch Verification: To examine the efficiency of batch
verification, we vary the number of data contributors from
1 to 1 million by exponential growth. The performance of
the corresponding single signature verification is provided
as a baseline. Fig. 4c depicts the evaluation results using
SS512 and MNT159, where verification time per signature
(abbreviated as VTPS) is computed by dividing the total
verification time by the number of data contributors. In
particular, such a performance measure in an average sense
can be found in [41]. From Fig. 4c, we can see that when the
scale of data acquisition or data trading is small, e.g., when
the number of data contributors is 10, TPDM saves 48.22%
and 87.94% of VTPS in SS512 and MNT159, respectively.
When the scale becomes larger, TPDM’s advantage over the
baseline is more remarkable. This is owing to the fact that
TPDM amortizes the overhead of 3 time-consuming pairing
operations among all the data contributors.
We now compare the batch verification efficiency of
two settings. Although the baseline of MNT159 increases
41.44% verification latency than that of SS512, MNT159’s
implementation is more efficient when the number of data
contributors is larger than 10, e.g., when supporting as many
as 1 million data contributors, MNT159 reduces 89.93% of
VTPS than SS512. We explain the reason by analyzing the
asymptotic value of VTPS:
lim
n→+∞
3Tpar + nTmtp + nTexp
n
= Tmtp + Texp. (30)
Here, we let Tpar , Tmtp, and Texp denote the time overheads
of a pairing operation, a MapToPoint hashing, and an expo-
nentiation in Table 1, respectively. From Equation (30), we
can draw that if the time overheads of additional operations,
e.g., Tmtp and Texp, are approaching or even greater than
that of pairing operation (e.g., in SS512), their effect cannot
be elided. Besides, the expensive additional operations will
cancel part of the advantage gained by batch verification.
Even so, the batch verification scheme can still sharply
reduce per-signature verification cost.
These evaluation results reveal that TPDM can indeed
help to reduce the computation overheads of the service
provider and the data consumer by introducing two-layer
batch verifications, especially in large-scale data markets.
6.2 Communication Overhead
In this section, we show the communication overheads of
the profile matching service and the distribution fitting
service separately.
Fig. 5 plots the communication overhead of profile
matching, where the identity-based signature scheme is
implemented in MNT159, the number of attributes β is fixed
at 10, and the threshold δ takes 12. Here, the communication
overhead merely counts in the amount of sending content.
Besides, we only consider the correctness verification. In
fact, when the number of valid data contributors m is 104, if
we check 26 unmatched ones for completeness, it incurs ad-
ditional communication overheads of 80.03KB at the service
provider, and 3.35KB at the data consumer. Moreover, our
statistics on the dataset show a linear correlation between
the numbers of matched data contributors φ and valid ones
m, where the matching ratio is 4.24% in average.
The first observation from Fig. 5 is that the commu-
nication overheads of the service provider and the data
consumer grow linearly with the number of valid data
contributors m, while the communication overhead of each
data contributor remains unchanged. The reason is that each
data contributor just needs to do one profile submission,
and thus its cost is independent of m. However, the service
provider primarily needs to send m encrypted similarities
for decryption, and to forward the indexes and the ci-
phertexts of φ matched data contributors for verifications.
Regarding the data consumer, her communication overhead
mainly comes from one data submission and the delivery of
φ encrypted similarities for decryption. These imply that the
communication overheads of the service provider and the
data consumer are both linear with m. Here, we note that x,
y axes in Fig. 5 are log-scaled, and thus the communication
overhead of the data consumer, containing a constant of one
data submission overhead, seems non-linear. In particular,
when m ≤ 100, one data submission overhead dominates
the total communication overhead, and this interval looks
like a horizontal line; while m ≥ 1000, the communication
overhead of delivering φ encrypted similarities dominates,
and that interval appears linear.
14 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON KNOWLEDGE AND DATA ENGINEERING, VOL. XX, NO. XX, XXXX 2018
10
-4
10
-3
10
-2
10
-1
10
 0
10
 1
10
 2
10
 3
1 10
1
10
2
10
3
10
4
10
5
10
6
C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
 O
v
er
h
ea
d
 (
M
B
)
Number of Valid Data Contributors
Each Data Contributor
Service Provider
Data Consumer
Fig. 5. Comm. overhead of profile matching.
10
-3
10
-2
10
-1
10
 0
10
 1
10
 2
1 10
1
10
2
10
3
10
4
C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
 O
v
er
h
ea
d
 (
M
B
)
Number of Valid Data Contributors
Each Data Contributor
Service Provider
Data Consumer
Fig. 6. Comm. overhead of distribution fitting.
 0
 2
 4
 6
 8
 10
 12
 14
 16
 18
 0  2  4  6  8  10  12  14  16  18  20
P
er
 S
ig
n
at
u
re
 (
m
s)
Fraction of Invalid Signatures α (%)
Single Signature Verification
Batch Verification
Fig. 7. Feasibility of tracing algorithm.
The second key observation from Fig. 5 is that when the
number of valid data contributors m = 10, all the three
system participants spend roughly the same network band-
width. The cause lies in that the small matching ratio implies
a small number of matched data contributors involved in
the correctness verification. Specifically, when m = 10, the
average number of matched data contributors is only about
0.4 < 1, and the communication overheads of each data
contributor, the service provider, and the data consumer are
2.60KB, 2.37KB, and 2.59KB, respectively.
We plot the communication overhead of multivariate
Gaussian distribution fitting in Fig. 6, where the number
of random variables β is set to be 8. From Fig. 6, we can see
that the communication overhead of the service provider
increases linearly with the number of valid data contributors
m. This is because the service provider mainly needs to
send 2βm BGN-type ciphertexts for verifications, which is
linear withm. By comparison, besides each data contributor,
the data consumer’s bandwidth overhead stays the same,
since she needs to deliver 2β BGN-type ciphertexts for
decryption, which is independent of m.
We finally note that the transmission of BGN-type ci-
phertexts dominates the total communication overheads in
both data services, while the network overhead incurred
by sending the pseudo identities and the aggregate signa-
ture is comparatively low. Therefore, we do not plot the
cases for SS512, which are similar to Fig. 5 and Fig. 6. In
particular, compared with MNT159, SS512 adds 132 bytes
and 176 bytes at each data contributor in profile matching
and distribution fitting, respectively. Besides, SS512 adds 44
bytes at the service provider in two data services, but incurs
no extra bandwidth overhead at the data consumer.
6.3 Feasibility of Registration Center
In this section, we consider the feasibility of the registration
center from the perspectives of computation, communica-
tion, and storage overheads. We implement the identity-
based signature scheme with MNT159. In addition, for
profile matching, the number of attributes is fixed at 10,
and the number of valid data contributors m is set to be
10000. Accordingly, the number of matched ones φ is 449
at δ = 12. For distribution fitting, we fix the number of
random variables β at 8, and set the number of valid data
contributors to be 10000.
First, the primary responsibility of the registration center
is to initialize the system parameters for the identity-based
signature scheme and the BGN cryptosystem. Besides, she is
required to perform totally (m+ φ) and (β+7)β2 decryptions
in the profile matching service and the distribution fitting
service, respectively. The total computation overheads are
16.692s and 3.065s in two data services, respectively, which
are only 0.18% and 2.11% of the service provider’s overall
workloads. Furthermore, the one-time setup overhead can
be amortized over several data services. Second, the main
communication overheads of the registration center in two
data services are incurred by returning decrypted results,
which occupies the network bandwidth of 15.31KB and
0.23KB, respectively. Third, the storage overhead of the reg-
istration center mostly comes from maintaining the online
database of registrations and the real-time certificated bul-
letin board, and caching the intermediate plaintexts. These
two parts take up roughly 600.59KB and 586.11KB storage
space in the profile matching service and the distribution
fitting service, respectively.
In conclusion, our design of registration center has a
light load, and can be implemented in a distributed manner,
where each registration center can be responsible for one or
a few data services. In particular, consistent hashing [42] can
be employed to facilitate the information synchronization
among multiple registration centers, e.g., guaranteeing a
certain number of decryptions for each data service. Be-
sides, using the standard techniques from [43], the original
partially homomorphic cryptosystems can be extended to
their threshold multi-authority versions, which implies the
improved robustness of TPDM by distributing several reg-
istration centers in data markets.
6.4 Feasibility of Tracing Algorithm
To evaluate the feasibility of `-DEPTH-TRACING algorithm
when the batch verification fails, we generate a collection
of 1024 valid signatures, and then randomly corrupt an
α-fraction of the batch by replacing them with random
elements from the cyclic groupG1. We repeat this evaluation
with various values of α ranging from 0 to 20%, and
compare verification time per signature (VTPS) in batch
verification with that in single signature verification. Here,
the overall batch verification latency includes the time cost
spent in identifying invalid signatures. Fig. 7 presents the
evaluation results using the efficient MNT159.
As shown in Fig. 7, batch verification is preferable to
single signature verification when the ratio of invalid signa-
tures is up to 16%. The worst case of batch verification hap-
pens when the invalid signatures are distributed uniformly.
In case the invalid signatures are clustered together, the
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performance of batch verification should be better. Further-
more, as shown in the initialization phase of Algorithm 1,
the service provider can preset a practical tracing depth, and
let those unidentified data contributors do resubmissions.
7 RELATED WORK
In this section, we briefly review related work.
7.1 Data Market Design
In recent years, data market design has gained increasing in-
terest from the database community. The seminal paper [10]
by Balazinska et al. discusses the implications of the emerg-
ing digital data markets, and lists the research opportunities
in this direction. Koutris et al. [44] presented a flexible data
trading format, i.e., query-based data pricing. Later, Lin and
Kifer [45] designed an arbitrage-free pricing function for
arbitrary query formats. For personal data sharing, Li et
al. [46] proposed a theory of pricing private data based
on differential privacy. Upadhyaya et al. [11] developed a
middleware system, called DataLawyer, to formally specify
data use policies, and to automatically enforce these pre-
defined terms during data usage. Jung et al. [47] focused on
the dataset resale issue at the dishonest data consumers.
However, the original intention of above works is pricing
data or monitoring data usage rather than integrating data
truthfulness with privacy preservation in data markets,
which is the consideration of this work1.
7.2 Signcryption
Data authentication and data confidentiality are two basic
requirements in secure communication. To efficiently guar-
antee these two properties simultaneously, Zheng et al. [49]
first introduced the terminology signcryption, which inte-
grates digital signature with public key encryption. To re-
duce communication overhead, a number of identity-based
signcryption schemes [50], [51] were proposed. In most
signcryption schemes (e.g., [49], [50]), a third party requires
the knowledge of plaintext to verify the message’s origin. In
contrast to these works, Encrypt-then-Sign paradigm in [23]
and the identity-based signcryption scheme in [51] support
public ciphertext authenticity, which convinces a third party
(e.g., the data consumer in our model) of data sources’
reliability without revealing the content of raw data.
Unfortunately, when existing signcryption schemes are
directly applied to data markets, they only provide the
truthfulness of data collection, but fail to support outcome
verification. Besides, these schemes don’t facilitate identity
preservation and batch verification [52], which are necessary
in practical data collection and data trading environments.
7.3 Practical Computation on Encrypted Data
To get a tradeoff between functionality and performance,
partially homomorphic encryption (PHE) schemes were
exploited to enable practical computation on encrypted
data. Unlike those prohibitively slow fully homomorphic
encryption (FHE) schemes [53], [54] that support arbitrary
1. The early version of this paper [48] mainly focused on the profile
matching service.
operations, PHE schemes focus on specific function(s), and
achieve better performance in practice. A celebrated exam-
ple is the Paillier cryptosystem [30], which preserves the
group homomorphism of addition and allows multiplica-
tion by a constant. Thus, it can be utilized in data aggrega-
tion [20] and interactive personalized recommendation [25],
[33]. Yet, another one is ElGamal encryption [24], which
supports homomorphic multiplication, and it is widely
employed in voting [55]. Moreover, the BGN scheme [32]
facilitates one extra multiplication followed by multiple
additions, which in turn allows the oblivious evaluation of
quadratic multivariate polynomials, e.g., shortest distance
query [31] and optimal meeting location decision [56].
These schemes enable the service provider and the data
consumer to efficiently perform data processing and out-
come verification over encrypted data, respectively. Thus,
they can remedy the potential defects in the conventional
signcryption schemes. Additionally, we note that the out-
come verification in data markets differs from the verifiable
computation in outsourcing scenarios [57], since before data
processing, the data consumer, as a client, does not hold a
local copy of the collected dataset.
8 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have proposed the first efficient secure
scheme TPDM for data markets, which simultaneously
guarantees data truthfulness and privacy preservation. In
TPDM, the data contributors have to truthfully submit
their own data, but cannot impersonate others. Besides,
the service provider is enforced to truthfully collect and
process data. Furthermore, both the personally identifiable
information and the sensitive raw data of data contributors
are well protected. In addition, we have instantiated TPDM
with two different data services, and extensively evaluated
their performances on two real-world datasets. Evaluation
results have demonstrated the scalability of TPDM in the
context of large user base, especially from computation and
communication overheads. At last, we have shown the feasi-
bility of introducing the semi-honest registration center with
detailed theoretical analysis and substantial evaluations.
As for further work in data markets, it would be inter-
esting to consider diverse data services with more complex
mathematic formulas, e.g., Machine Learning as a Service
(MLaaS) [29], [58], [59], [60], [61]. For a specific data service,
it is well-motivated to uncover some novel security prob-
lems, such as privacy preservation and verifiability.
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